Tsukada Lab. Computer Network Group

SwitchAuthn: Trusted Hardware-Based Layer-2 Authentication to Prevent MAC Spoofing in Ethernet Networks

Anisha Ghosh, Manabu Tsukada

40th International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications (AINA 2026), Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, 2026年4月8日

3行要約

  • SwitchAuthnはハードウェアに裏付けられた認証で、イーサネットスイッチの端末確認を強化する。
  • TPMによるチャレンジ・レスポンスを使い、端末が保持する資格情報をネットワークへの接続と結び付ける。
  • 試作機で、MACなりすましへの耐性、認証遅延、処理負荷を評価した。

論文の図

図 2: SwitchAuthnの端末認証
図 2. SwitchAuthnの端末認証出典: Ghosh et al., 40th International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications (AINA 2026) (2026)(著者原稿の図版) の図 2スイッチがハードウェアに裏付けられた資格情報を検証してから、ネットワーク接続を許可する流れが分かる。

アブストラクト(原文)

Modern switches rely on Access Control Lists (ACLs) for Media Access Control (MAC)-based access control, leaving networks vulnerable to MAC address spoofing attacks that succeed in 78% of enterprise networks. This paper presents SwitchAuthn, a device-centric TPM 2.0-secured challenge-response mechanism that closes the critical authentication gap before MACsec channel establishment. Unlike IEEE 802.1AE (MACsec) and 802.1X approaches that assume pre-established device trust, SwitchAuthn enforces cryptographic device identity verification at Layer-2 using HMAC-SHA256 with hardware-protected keys. Prototype evaluation using GNS3 with authentic Cisco IOS images (v15.1) and TPM 2.0 simulator demonstrates: (1) mean authentication latency of 2.827 ms (median 2.695 ms, <10 ms target); (2) 100% MAC spoofing prevention across 1,000 test attempts (vs. 0% for baseline port security); (3) <3% CPU overhead under sustained load (7-1000 devices); (4) comprehensive defense against replay attacks (nonce-based), MITM attacks (challenge uniqueness), and DoS attacks (rate-limiting with attestation-bound queues). The protocol achieves RFC 4868, FIPS 180-4/198-1, and ISO/IEC 11889-3 compliance while maintaining seamless IEEE 802.1X/RADIUS integration. Experimental validation demonstrates linear scalability, zero false positives observed over 48-hour continuous operation (1,400+ authentication cycles, 95% confidence interval: 0-0.26% false positive rate), and production-ready deployment architecture addressing rate-limit abuse through three-layer hybrid countermeasures.

引用方法

A. Ghosh and M. Tsukada, “SwitchAuthn: Trusted Hardware-Based Layer-2 Authentication to Prevent MAC Spoofing in Ethernet Networks,” in 40th International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications (AINA 2026), Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, 2026, doi: 10.1007/978-3-032-23311-0_5.

BibTeX

@inproceedings{Ghosh2026,
  title         = {SwitchAuthn: Trusted Hardware-Based Layer-2 Authentication to Prevent MAC Spoofing in Ethernet Networks},
  author        = {Anisha Ghosh and Manabu Tsukada},
  doi           = {10.1007/978-3-032-23311-0_5},
  year          = {2026},
  date          = {2026-04-08},
  urldate       = {2026-04-08},
  booktitle     = {40th International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications (AINA 2026)},
  address       = {Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand},
  abstract      = {Modern switches rely on Access Control Lists (ACLs) for Media Access Control (MAC)-based access control, leaving networks vulnerable to MAC address spoofing attacks that succeed in 78% of enterprise networks. This paper presents SwitchAuthn, a device-centric TPM 2.0-secured challenge-response mechanism that closes the critical authentication gap before MACsec channel establishment. Unlike IEEE 802.1AE (MACsec) and 802.1X approaches that assume pre-established device trust, SwitchAuthn enforces cryptographic device identity verification at Layer-2 using HMAC-SHA256 with hardware-protected keys. Prototype evaluation using GNS3 with authentic Cisco IOS images (v15.1) and TPM 2.0 simulator demonstrates: (1) mean authentication latency of 2.827 ms (median 2.695 ms, <10 ms target); (2) 100% MAC spoofing prevention across 1,000 test attempts (vs. 0% for baseline port security); (3) <3% CPU overhead under sustained load (7-1000 devices); (4) comprehensive defense against replay attacks (nonce-based), MITM attacks (challenge uniqueness), and DoS attacks (rate-limiting with attestation-bound queues). The protocol achieves RFC 4868, FIPS 180-4/198-1, and ISO/IEC 11889-3 compliance while maintaining seamless IEEE 802.1X/RADIUS integration. Experimental validation demonstrates linear scalability, zero false positives observed over 48-hour continuous operation (1,400+ authentication cycles, 95% confidence interval: 0-0.26% false positive rate), and production-ready deployment architecture addressing rate-limit abuse through three-layer hybrid countermeasures.},
  keywords      = {Other},
  pubstate      = {published},
  tppubtype     = {inproceedings}
}